

Abstract:

This study examines the shifts in Israel's political legitimacy across the United States and Western Europe following the 2023 Gaza War. It posits that the Western support is no longer a monolithic bloc but has undergone a process of "normative fragmentation" under the pressure of moral and legal conditionality. Employing a comparative analytical approach, the research utilizes a "divergence indicators" framework to measure the gap between grassroots legitimacy (based on Pew Research Center, YouGov, and Eurobarometer data) and official/institutional legitimacy.

The findings suggest a structural transformation in legitimacy: while the United States maintains a "strategic legitimacy," Western Europe exhibits sharp variations among models of "steadfast support" (Germany), "pragmatic balancing" (France), and "critical revisionism" (Spain and Ireland). The study highlights the role of "responsiveness to international institutional pressures" as a mediating variable that has redefined the boundaries of political acceptability in Western discourse.

Keywords: Political Legitimacy, Gaza War, USA, Western Europe, Moral Conditionality, Pragmatic Balancing.

The Future of Israel in the United States and Western Europe: Shifts in Political Legitimacy Post-Gaza War

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Introduction

In international relations, political legitimacy is a strategic resource as vital as the material power; it dictates a state's ability to forge alliances, solidify its narrative, mitigate diplomatic pressures, and ensure sustained political and military support. Following the outbreak of the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, Israel's image in the West has undergone a marked transformation. Clear indicators have emerged suggesting a shift in the “cost of support” within the Western sphere. This shift is evident not only in official political discourse but also in the trends of the Western public opinion, which fundamentally impacts Israel's future political legitimacy. This understanding aligns with the literature on legitimacy in international relations, which posits that legitimacy influences compliance and support even in the absence of a central global authority (Hurd, [Spring 1999](#)).

Polling data in the United States indicates a rise in negative sentiments toward Israel between 2022 and 2025, with a distinct increase in unfavorable views (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#)). Similarly, *YouGov's EuroTrack* series shows a record decline in net favorability toward Israel across several Western European countries, alongside a decrease in the percentage of people who view the Israeli response as proportionate (Smith, [June 3, 2025](#)).

1. Significance of the Study

- **Scientific Significance:** Contributing to the literature on international political legitimacy through analyzing a contemporary case study that influences the Western order.
- **Practical Significance:** Recognizing how shifts in the West impact military support, parliamentary decisions, foreign policy, and diplomatic maneuverability, such as debates within European institutions or legislation and appropriations within the United States Congress.

2. Research Problem

The research problem focuses on analyzing the shifts in Israel's political legitimacy in the West (the United States and Western Europe) post-Gaza war; identifying the factors that led to a political reassessment at both official and grassroots levels. The problem arises from the clear contradiction between:

- The continuation of official support in specific political domains, and
- The escalation of public, partisan, and human rights pressures as well as an increasing circle of criticism, particularly within the United States, according to recent polls.

The central research question is: *How has Israel's political legitimacy changed in the United States and Western Europe following the 2023 Gaza War, and what factors have driven this change?*

Sub-questions include:

- What are the differences in public opinion shifts between the United States and Western Europe?
- How has this shift reflected on the official political discourse (governments, parliaments, and councils)?
- What role do the media, the civil pressure, the partisan polarization, and the balance of power within the Western alliance play in explaining this transformation?
- Is this change situational -tied only to the war- or structural, affecting Israel's long-term position within the Western system?

3. Objectives of the Study

- Measuring the trajectory of Israel's political legitimacy shifts in public opinion and official discourse.
- Explaining the reasons for the divergent paths between the United States and Western Europe.
- Clarifying the roles of media, civil society, and partisan polarization in this shift.
- Analyzing the impact of this shift on tangible outcomes (language of official statements, degrees of conditionality, and ally variances).

4. Scope and Limitations

- **Temporal Scope:** October 7, 2023, to February 2026.
- **Spatial Scope:** The United States and a representative sample of Western European countries.
- **Thematic Scope:** Political legitimacy, without addressing legal or judicial adjudication.

5. Research Hypotheses

- **U.S. Polarization Hypothesis:** The shift in legitimacy within the U.S. manifests primarily through partisan and social division. This is evident in public opinion indicators regarding the Israeli government and the war's trajectory (Van Green et al., [Oct 3, 2025](#)).

- **Broad European Decline Hypothesis:** The shift in Western Europe appears as a broader trend of “declining favorability/rising negativity” in public opinion across multiple nations (Henley, [June 3, 2025](#)).
- **Conditional Legitimacy Hypothesis:** The increased use of humanitarian framing, proportionality, and “ceasefire” terminology in Western discourse indicates a transition from absolute to conditional support.

Research Methodology

The study adopts a *Comparative Qualitative Analytical approach*, tracing official political discourse and public opinion trends in the United States and Western Europe from 2023 to 2025. It utilizes government documents, parliamentary statements, and credible opinion polls as primary sources to measure shifts in political legitimacy, integrating them into an explanatory narrative that links evolving public sentiment to changes in elite policy.

The research employs the “Representative Case Studies” methodology. Rather than analyzing every nation individually, Western Europe is categorized into three primary groups based on the “Plurality of Voices in European Foreign Policy” school, as follows:

1. **Established Traditional Support:** Represented by *Germany* (due to the Holocaust legacy and the commitment to Israel's security as a *Staatsräson* or supreme state interest) (Kundnani, [2015](#)).
2. **Critical Revisionism and International Legitimacy:** Represented by *Spain and Ireland* (who led the trend toward recognizing the State of Palestine and grounding legitimacy in international law) (Pardo, [2015](#)). This model illustrates the European Union as a “Normative Power” oscillating between moral values and strategic interests.
3. **Pragmatic Balancing:** Represented by *France*, which attempts to balance its strategic ties with Israel with its interests in the Arab world—a diplomatic tradition historically known as *La politique Arabe de la France*, established by Charles de Gaulle (Vaïsse, [1998](#)).

By utilizing the concept of the “Legalization of Politics,” this study does not analyze legal rulings based on their validity, it rather analyzes the political impact of these rulings on the discourse of European leaders.

- **Comparative Framework:**

The study is designed as a comparative analysis between two primary cases:

1. The United States.

2. **Western Europe** (analyzed as a multi-level entity—EU + Member States—using 2–4 representative countries).

- **Analytical Methods:**

1. **Political Discourse Analysis:** Examining Council of the EU and European Council conclusions, European Parliament resolutions on the humanitarian situation in Gaza (2024), and United States Congressional records, including the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (2024) ([European Council conclusions of 18 December 2025](#); EP resolutions: Humanitarian situation in Gaza, [January 18, 2024](#); H.R.8034 - Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, [April 20, 2024](#)).

2. **Quantitative/Qualitative Content Analysis:** Monitoring the frequency of terms such as “Ceasefire, Proportionality, Civilians, Aid, Legitimacy, and Human Rights” before and after pivotal events.

3. **Public Opinion Trend Analysis:** Utilizing *Pew Research Center* data for U.S. trends (e.g., “going too far” in military operations) and the *Eurobarometer* and *YouGov EuroTrack* for European sentiment, supplemented by analyses from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) (Latest Surveys & Publications: 10 latest surveys, [Feb 2026](#); Barnes-Dacey et al., [March 6, 2024](#)).

I. INDICATORS FOR MEASURING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The study employs a multi-dimensional approach to quantify legitimacy shifts through the following indicators:

1. **Public Level:** Analysis of favorability ratings (Favorable, Unfavorable, and Neutral) towards Israel, its government, and its military operations (Van Green et al., [Oct 3, 2025](#)).

2. **Official Level:**

- **Discursive Nature:** Analyzing the tone of official statements (Absolute Support vs. Conditional Support or Criticism).
- **Rhetorical Frequency:** Measuring the recurrence of calls for a "Ceasefire" or "Humanitarian Aid."
- **Legislative Action:** Tracking voting patterns in the European Parliament.

- **Policy Implementation:** Monitoring the passage, suspension, or conditionality of appropriations and aid packages within the U.S. Congress (EP resolutions: Humanitarian situation in Gaza, [January 18, 2024](#)).

II. Data Sources

To ensure the highest level of empirical rigor, the study utilizes a mix of primary and secondary sources:

1. Primary Sources:

- **European Institutions:** Official conclusions and documents from the European Council and the Council of the European Union ([European Council conclusions of 18 December 2025](#)).
- **Legislative Records:** Resolutions and voting data from the European Parliament (EP resolutions: Humanitarian situation in Gaza, [January 18, 2024](#)).
- **U.S. Congressional Records:** Texts of bills, voting tallies, and appropriations acts, such as the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act H.R.8034 - Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, [April 20, 2024](#)).

2. Secondary Sources:

- **Statistical Pillars:** The study relies on the **Pew Research Center** and **YouGov** datasets for their robust longitudinal time-series capabilities.
- **Cross-Referencing:** These data are cross-referenced with **Eurobarometer** results to capture qualitative cultural shifts within European societies, alongside analyses from the **European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)** (Van Green et al., [Oct 3, 2025](#); [Standard Eurobarometer 101 - Spring 2024](#)).
- **Theoretical Literature:** The framework is grounded in the foundational works on legitimacy by Hurd ([Spring 1999](#)) and the literature on global order and alliance-building by Ikenberry ([2001](#)).
- **Variables and Indicators Matrix.**

A. Dependent Variable: Israel's Political Legitimacy in the West

Table 1 outlines the operational framework used to measure shifts in political legitimacy, categorized into four interconnected dimensions: Public, Official, Institutional/Legislative, and Responsiveness to International Institutions.

Table (1): Multi-level Framework for Measuring Political Legitimacy Shifts

Dimension	Indicator	Data Source	Measurement Method
Public Legitimacy (U.S.)	% Unfavorable view of Israel/Gov; "Goes too far"	Pew Research	Time-series comparison (Pre/Post)
Public Legitimacy (W. Europe)	Net favorability/negativity across multiple nations	YouGov EuroTrack	International & temporal comparison
Official Legitimacy	Degree of "Conditional Support" in statements	Official Documents	Coding: Absolute Support / Conditional / Direct Criticism
Institutional/Legislative	Voting behavior; Legislation; Parliamentary stances	Parliamentary/Congress Databases	Tracking resolutions and legislative shifts
Response to Int'l Pressure	Alignment with international rulings (ICJ, ICC, UN)	ICJ/UN Reports; National responses	Content Analysis: Measuring the "Gap" between int'l rulings and official reaction

Source: Adapted from (Hurd, 2007)

This multi-dimensional framework enables the study to transcend a monolithic reading of legitimacy shifts by establishing a causal link between public sentiment, official trajectories, and institutional behavior within the Western political system. Furthermore, it provides a clear methodological foundation for comparing the pre- and post-Gaza war eras, allowing for a precise determination of whether these transformations represent a transient, situational shift or a profound structural reconfiguration of the sources of political legitimacy in the West.

B. Independent Variables

Table 2 presents the explanatory variables that contributed to reshaping Israel's political legitimacy post-Gaza war, covering public pressure, partisan polarization, and the costs of alliance.

Table (2): Pressure Factors Reshaping Political Legitimacy

Variable	Operational Indicators	Measurement Method
Public Opinion Pressure	Shift in poll percentages; Widening partisan gap	Trend analysis of Pew/YouGov
Partisan Polarization (U.S.)	Democrat vs. Republican divergence in stances	Pew/Reuters-Ipsos datasets
Moral/Human Rights Pressure	Rise of “Human Rights/Civilians/Starvation” in discourse	Content analysis of official statements
Cost of Alliance	Shift from “Endorsement” to “Reassessment/Conditionality”	Coding official data; Tracking aid decisions
European Environment	Variance between France, Germany, Spain, and Italy	Comparative case study of selected EU nations

This framework demonstrates that shifts in political legitimacy cannot be attributed to a single factor. Rather, they are the product of a complex interplay between public opinion pressure, domestic polarization, ethical considerations, the costs of alliance, and the variances among European nations. Consequently, this provides an analytical foundation for understanding how these cumulative factors have driven several Western governments to transition from traditional, unconditional support towards more cautious and conditional policy formulas regarding Israel.

In short, Table 1 provides indicators to measure the outcomes of this transformation, while Table 2 identifies the explanatory variables behind these shifts. Together, they facilitate the construction of an analytical model that establishes a robust link between causes and effects.

Literature Review

1. Political Legitimacy in International Relations

- **Legitimacy as a Resource for Reducing Compliance Costs** Foundational literature posits that legitimacy is not merely a matter of reputation; it generates a greater predisposition for compliance and support because it renders an act or actor “acceptable and justified.” This conceptualization serves as the starting point for this study, as we examine the shifting capacity of the West to politically justify its support for Israel. Key takeaways include:
 - Legitimacy fluctuates with changes in the perception of “appropriateness.”
 - The erosion of legitimacy raises the political cost of decision-making, even when material interests remain constant (Hurd, [Spring 1999](#)).

2. Alliances and the Western Order: Managing the Costs of Support

Alliances are not built on power alone but on an institutional-normative framework. Scholars like G. John Ikenberry argue that the sustainability of the Western alliance requires the internal and external justifiability of policies. This study treats the West as an “alliance space” governed by internal domestic calculations (parliaments, voters, and public opinion) and external pressures (image, norms, and international law) ([European Council Conclusions on the Middle East, Jun 26, 2025](#)).

3. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Democracies

Literature in this field suggests that foreign policy in democratic systems is inseparable from partisan polarization, media pressure, and the cost of international reputation.

- **The United States Context:** Data from the *Pew Research Center* reveals a clear shift toward negative sentiment regarding Israel compared to previous years; reinforcing the hypothesis of “rising political costs for unconditional support” (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#)).
- **The Electoral Link:** Recent analytical works, such as Yevseenko ([Dec 2025](#)), establish a direct link between the Gaza war and the U.S. electoral cycle and domestic political landscape.

4. Western Europe: Shifting Sentiment and Institutional Variance

A. Public Opinion Trends: The *YouGov (EuroTrack)* series provides comparative measurements across Western Europe, showing record lows in “net favorability” toward Israel and minimal percentages viewing its conduct as “proportionate” (Smith, [June 3, 2025](#)). This serves as a central pillar for the study's European axis.

Furthermore, media coverage grounded in these surveys corroborates the shifting trend; such reports are utilized as secondary attribution rather than as a substitute for the original YouGov datasets (Henley, [June 3, 2025](#)).

B. The Official Shift: From Solidarity to Conditionality:

- **EU Discourse:** ([European Council Conclusions on the Middle East, Jun 26, 2025](#)) The EU discourse reflects explicit calls for ceasefires and humanitarian concerns, providing a rich dataset for analyzing “conditionality” through linguistic coding.
- **The Human Rights Clause:** Reports by the Associated Press highlight debates within the EU regarding Israel's compliance with the human-rights provisions in its “Association Agreements,” serving as a political indicator of legitimacy pressure (McNeil & Ella, [June 23, 2025](#)).
- **Internal Divergence:** **Reuters** documentation of Germany's opposition to suspending EU-Israel trade deals illustrates the European “plurality of voices,” distinguishing it from the more centralized United States approach ([Germany against suspending EU deal with Israel, official says](#)).

5. “Conditionality” and the Transformation of Western Discourse

Contemporary literature treats the increased frequency of terms like “Ceasefire, Civilians, and International Law” as signaling a transition from absolute to conditional support. This is further evidenced by internal conflicts within the U.S. administration regarding the classification of the humanitarian situation (Banco et al., [Jan 30, 2026](#)).

6. Research Gap

Based on the aforementioned literature, two distinct gaps emerge:

1. **The Integration Gap (Public vs. Official):** While much of the existing work either measures public opinion (Pew/YouGov) or describes official policy (EU documents/News), few studies integrate both into a single model to measure “Political Legitimacy” as a composite indicator (Public + Official) (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#)).
2. **The Methodological Comparative Gap:** There is a high-quality descriptive coverage of each region individually. However, comparative analysis that explains *why* transformation mechanisms differ (United States partisan polarization vs. European institutional variance) lacks clear, measurable operational indicators (McNeil & Ella, [June 23, 2025](#)).

Accordingly, this study contributes through:

- Developing a “Legitimacy Shift Index” based on longitudinal polling series (United States and Western Europe).
- Conducting Content Analysis of official discourse to quantify the degree of conditionality.
- Building an Explanatory Comparison that bridges the gap between public sentiment and official policy.

Literature Review

I. Political Legitimacy: Operational Definition and Conceptual Framework

1. Operationalizing Political Legitimacy

In the context of this study, political legitimacy is operationalized as the level of political acceptance or “appropriateness” afforded to Israel by Western actors (both the public and political elites). This is empirically reflected through:

- **Public Opinion Trends:** (Favorable vs. unfavorable attitudes, perceptions of “proportionate” vs. “disproportionate” actions, etc.).
- **Official Discourse:** The tone and substance of formal rhetoric (unconditional support, conditionality, or overt criticism).

This definition aligns with the conceptualization of legitimacy as a primary driver of compliance and support in international politics (Hurd, [Spring 1999](#)).

2. Shifts in Political Legitimacy

This refers to the measurable temporal change in acceptance and support indicators—at both the grassroots and official levels—comparing the pre-war baseline to the various stages of the post-war period.

3. Western Europe (Operational Scope)

For this study, Western Europe is operationally defined by the six EuroTrack nations (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, and Spain), which serve as a standardized survey sample for unified data analysis (Smith, [June 3, 2025](#)).

Political legitimacy is a cornerstone in explaining the behavior of states and alliances. In the absence of a global supreme authority, international relations are governed not only by the balance of power but also by the socio-political acceptance within influential domestic environments. Ian Hurd provides a seminal definition of legitimacy as the “belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed,” which

enhances the likelihood of compliance even in the absence of direct coercion (Hurd, [Spring 1999](#)).

From this perspective, legitimacy becomes a strategic resource that lowers the "cost of alliance." Conversely, its erosion triggers parliamentary scrutiny and public pressure, shifting foreign policy from absolute commitment to conditional engagement.

II. Legitimacy and Alliances within the Western Order

To understand how the United States and Western Europe interact with Israel, legitimacy must be situated within the literature of the Liberal International Order and alliance-building. In his work *After Victory*, G. John Ikenberry argues that the stability of alliances is not predicated solely on material interests, but on an institutional-normative framework that confers internal and external legitimacy upon policies (Ikenberry, [2001](#)).

Under this framework, if the domestic cost of defending an ally rises—specifically before parliaments, electorates, and the media—the alliance transitions from a "fixed commitment" to a "conditional and reassessed relationship." This theoretical lens is highly suitable for analyzing the shifts in Western support for Israel following the Gaza war.

III. Legitimacy and Public Opinion in Western Democracies

In democratic systems, foreign policy is inextricably linked to the "public mood." Longitudinal polling, such as that conducted by the Pew Research Center in the United States, reveals long-term shifts in the American public's perception of Israel (Van Green et al., [Oct 3, 2025](#)). Similarly, the YouGov EuroTrack series measures changes in "net favorability" toward Israel across Europe over time (Henley, [June 3, 2025](#)).

These datasets allow for the testing of the study's core hypothesis: As grassroots legitimacy declines, the pressure on political elites intensifies, necessitating a recalibration of official discourse and policy.

Israel's Image in the West before the 2023 Gaza War

Introduction:

To comprehend the shifts in Israel's position within the United States and Western Europe following the Gaza war, it is essential first to delineate its standing before 2023. This section aims to establish a "baseline" through analyzing three

interconnected elements: public opinion trends, traditional political support patterns, and Israel's status within Western discourse.

I. Public Opinion Trends Before 2023

Before the Gaza war, Israel's image among the Western public was characterized by a clear divergence between the United States and Western Europe.

- **In the United States:** Data from the Pew Research Center (2022) indicated that more than half of the Americans (55%) held a favorable view of Israel, compared to 41% who held an unfavorable view. This suggests a significant level of grassroots legitimacy before 2023 (Silver & Fagen, [July 11, 2022](#)). While a substantial percentage expressed sympathy toward Israel, internal criticism was already mounting among younger demographics.
- **In Western Europe:** Public opinion tended toward a more balanced—and at times more critical—stance. YouGov EuroTrack (2023) findings revealed that European public sentiment was heavily invested in the “two-state solution” framework, with fluctuating levels of sympathy. This reflects that Israel's image in Europe was more fragile and susceptible to events compared to its standing in the United States (Smith, [July 3, 2023](#)).

In summary, Israel entered the pre-war phase with varying degrees of grassroots legitimacy: relatively robust in the United States, yet considerably more fragile in Western Europe.

II. Traditional Patterns of Political Support

At the official policy level, the U.S.-Israel relationship before 2023 was defined by a stable institutional support pattern, categorizing Israel as a “strategic ally” with a recurring commitment to its security ([U.S relations with Israel](#)).

- **The United States Model: United States Department of State** documents emphasized Washington's enduring commitment to Israel's security as a primary strategic ally in the Middle East—a stance maintained by successive administrations regardless of partisan affiliation (Silver & Fagen, [July 11, 2022](#)).
- **The Western European Model:** Political support followed a dual formula: partnership and cooperation on one hand, and a consistent emphasis on the two-state solution and legal/human rights considerations on the other. This framework is documented via the European External Action Service (EEAS), which balances cooperation with the normative and institutional foundations governing the EU's approach (The European Union and Israel, [July 28, 2021](#)).

Consequently, Western political support before the war can be described as:

- Solid and institutionalized in the United States.
- Relatively conditional in Western Europe.
- Generally insulated from the widespread scrutiny that would emerge later.

III. Israel's Standing in Western Discourse Before 2023

Before the Gaza war, Israel occupied a unique position in Western discourse, characterized by three primary traits:

1. **The Security Partner:** Presentation as a vital partner within regional stability priorities.
2. **Shared Values:** Alignment through the vocabulary of “shared values” (democracy and the rule of law) in official transatlantic rhetoric.
3. **The Two-State Reference:** The continued presence of the “two-state solution” as a foundational reference in European discourse, indicating that support was not detached from a political vision for resolution.

Historically, Israel was often presented as the “sole liberal democracy in the Middle East.” Furthermore, the collective memory of the Holocaust in Europe played a significant role in shaping Western sensitivity toward Israeli security. However, even before the war, Western discourse witnessed a gradual escalation of criticism regarding settlement policies and the occupation, particularly within academic and human rights circles, suggesting a latent tension that preceded the conflict (U.S relations with Israel; The European Union and Israel, [July 28, 2021](#)).

Conclusion: The Baseline

Israel's image in the West before the Gaza war can be categorized into three core elements:

1. Relatively strong grassroots legitimacy in the United States and weaker legitimacy in Europe.
2. Stable institutional political support, with varying degrees of conditionality.
3. A Western discourse that merged strategic endorsement with limited human-rights-based criticism.

This status quo represents the baseline against which subsequent transformations are measured. The impact of the Gaza war can thus be understood as a transition from a period of relative stability to a phase of “re-negotiating political legitimacy” within the West.

Shifts in Political Legitimacy in the West Post-Gaza War

I. General Introduction: From Traditional Support to Increasing Accountability

The Gaza war has served as a rigorous political litmus test for the foundations of Western support for Israel. This is not because alliances have collapsed, but because the political cost of justifying such support within Western democracies has surged. This rise in cost is driven by the escalating humanitarian crisis, extensive media coverage, and widespread protests. This shift can be traced through two primary sources: public opinion trends and the language of official documentation (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#)).

Polling data from 2024–2025 in the United States and Western Europe indicates a significant transformation in Israel’s image. This shift is inextricably linked to parliamentary debates, evolving governmental rhetoric, and policymakers' attempts to reconcile strategic security commitments with mounting moral and humanitarian pressures. Consequently, these transformations are viewed not merely as a transient change in media mood, but as a deeper political trajectory affecting the very sources of legitimacy underpinning the Western-Israeli alliance.

II. The United States: Managing Political Costs Rather than Decoupling

Credible polling data in the U.S. demonstrates that Israel’s image has become increasingly negative. According to the Pew Research Center ([April 8, 2025](#)), 53% of American adults hold an unfavorable view of Israel, compared to 42% in March 2022—a significant temporal shift coinciding with the Gaza war and its repercussions (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#)).

At a more granular level, Pew (March 21, 2024) indicates that the American public distinguishes between the "justification for war" and the "conduct of war." Judgment on the latter has become highly polarized, creating fertile ground for increased domestic political pressure over time (Silver et al., [March 21, 2024](#)).

This historic shift culminated in the Gallup poll (February 2026), which recorded, for the first time in a quarter-century, that sympathy for Palestinians (41%) surpassed sympathy for Israelis (36%). The poll identified Independents as the primary drivers of this shift, with 41% favoring Palestinians versus 30% favoring Israelis. Most notably, sympathy for Palestinians among the 18–34 age group reached 53%—an absolute majority for the first time. These figures represent a structural erosion of Israel’s “grassroots legitimacy” within its most fortified stronghold, placing unprecedented pressure on U.S. decision-makers to balance strategic obligations

with a changing electoral base (Poll Shows a Historical Decline in Americans' Support for Israel, [February 27, 2026](#)).

This confirms the hypothesis of “Normative Fragmentation” in political legitimacy. The long-standing Israeli monopoly over the “victim narrative” in the American psyche has effectively been broken (Saad, [March 16, 2023](#)).

Official Discourse and “Political Mitigation”:

At the official level, United States Department of State briefings serve as a primary text for understanding how the administration manages political costs. In the March 25, 2024, briefing, there is a clear frequency of rhetoric regarding humanitarian aid and the commitment to its delivery. This reflects a persistent American pattern: maintaining the alliance while adopting humanitarian language as a tool for “political mitigation” under public pressure ([Department Press Briefing – March 25, 2024](#)).

The administration appears to be following a strategy of “Cost Management.” Rather than transitioning to direct institutional criticism, it expands the scope of humanitarian and legal terminology in its statements and initiates diplomatic efforts for phased ceasefires or prisoner exchanges, while emphasizing the necessity of adhering to international law.

To illustrate this internal polarization within the American political environment, Figure 1 presents a quantitative comparison between the “Public Disapproval” and “Official Response” indicators.

This comparison highlights the magnitude of the “Legitimacy Gap” between the radical shifts in the American public mood—particularly among youth—and an official discourse still governed by strategic alliance calculations and traditional institutional pressures.




Figure 1: Measuring the “Legitimacy Gap”: Discrepancy between Declining Public Favorability and Sustained Official Support for Israel in the United States (2024-2025)

The chart above illustrates that Israel's political legitimacy in the United States is experiencing a state of “Structural Schizophrenia.” While the public disapproval index has reached record highs—the highest in decades. The index for changes in official policy (such as arms embargoes or sanctions) remains notably low. This gap explains the persistent ambiguity in the White House’s rhetoric, as the administration maneuvers between the pressure of its electoral base and the preservation of national security pillars tied to Israel.

III. Western Europe: Toward Clearer Institutional Conditionality

The study recognizes the structural divergence in the national policies of Western European countries; thus, it treats them not as a monolithic political bloc, but as a turbulent normative system. The analysis focuses on the collective stances of European Union institutions in Brussels as the official framework, while utilizing Germany and Spain as opposites representing the maximum and minimum levels of political legitimacy granted to Israel (Tzidkiyahu & Bermant, 2024; Kundnani, 2015; Pardo, 2015).

In Western Europe, public opinion shifts appear more acute and synchronized. According to the YouGov EuroTrack analysis (June 3, 2025), “net favorability” indices reached historic lows in several countries (e.g., Germany -44, France -48, Spain -55), with favorable views dropping to a critical range. Major media outlets reflected these results, noting they are the lowest since measurements began (Henley, June 3, 2025).

At the official level, Western Europe demonstrates a clearer transition toward the language of “Conditional Support” than the United States. A pivotal example is the European Council Conclusions (June 26, 2025), which include an explicit call for an immediate ceasefire and the unconditional release of hostages, leading to a permanent end to hostilities, while emphasizing a commitment to international law (European Council Conclusions on the Middle East, Jun 26, 2025).

To employ comparative methodology and transcend the problematic generalization of the European stance, this study uses the 'Variance Radar' tool (as illustrated in Figure 2) to measure the diplomatic maneuvering space of three representative models. This visualization aims at quantifying the core disparities across five sovereign and institutional indicators. Such an approach enables the tracking of the 'normative fragmentation' that has impacted Israel’s political legitimacy, based on the internal power balances and international obligations unique to each model.




Figure 2: The Diplomatic Variance Radar: Measuring the Divergence in Israel's Political Legitimacy Across Three European Models (2024-2026)

The visual analysis in the radar chart above reveals a structural split. While the Spanish model (Critical Revisionism) expands to the furthest reaches of criticism—particularly regarding the recognition of the Palestinian state and legal accountability—the German model remains confined within the circle of traditional support. Meanwhile, the French path represents a “Pragmatic Balancing” act between the two. This disparity in “coverage areas” proves the study’s hypothesis: Israeli legitimacy in Europe no longer rests on a unified normative consensus but has become a hostage to sharp normative polarization following the events of October 7, 2023.

The French Model: Pragmatic Balancing and Strategic Ambiguity

France is categorized under the “Pragmatic Balancing” model, as its diplomacy seeks to reconcile its commitment to Israel’s security as a strategic partner with the preservation of its influence and socio-economic interests in the Arab World (Vaïsse, 1998). This has been evident in its fluctuating rhetoric throughout the Gaza war, reflecting an attempt to maintain the role of an “honest broker” to ensure the stability of its standing in the Mediterranean basin (Belkaïd, Nov 2023, Mars 2024).

In his analysis of the “French Dilemma,” Belkaïd (Nov 2023) highlights two critical points:

1. **Diplomatic Fluctuation:** President Emmanuel Macron shifted from proposing an “international coalition against Hamas” (to satisfy Israel and domestic stakeholders) to a rapid call for a ceasefire. This shift aimed to

safeguard French-Arab interests and prevent the eruption of domestic social tensions.

2. **The Decline of “La Politique Arabe”:** Belkaïd argues that France finds it increasingly difficult to sustain the historic “Pragmatic Balance” established by Charles de Gaulle due to extreme polarization, leaving French foreign policy in a state of “Strategic Confusion.”

By 2024, France continued this balancing act, attempting to avoid “international isolation” by gradually aligning with the more critical European stances—such as that of Spain—albeit through slower and more cautious steps.

Comparative Synthesis: Institutional Conditionality in Europe

Unlike the United States, where transformation is managed primarily through “tonal adjustments” in rhetoric, Western Europe exhibits a greater tendency to directly inject political conditionality into official documents. This makes the European shift appear more institutionalized and less elusive.

This study examines the transformations of Israel's political legitimacy within the European sphere based on the hypothesis that Western Europe does not constitute a monolithic political bloc in its handling of the 2023 Gaza war. Through a comparative analytical model, the study examines the structural variance between three primary archetypes:

- **Established Traditional Support:** Represented by Germany and its historical ties.
- **Critical Revisionism:** Led by Spain and Ireland, grounded in the framework of international law.
- **Pragmatic Balancing:** Represented by France’s attempt to reconcile its partnership with Israel with its vital interests in the Arab world.

This approach demonstrates how the war led to a “Fragmentation of Norms” within the European Union, transforming support from an automatic, “default” stance into a conditional and divided pattern.

Table (3): Indicators of Divergent Official Stances in Western Europe Regarding the Gaza War (Oct 2023 – Feb 2025)

Sovereign/Institutional Indicator	Established Support (Germany)	Pragmatic Balancing (France)	Critical Revisionism (Spain/Ireland)	Aggregate EU Result
UN General Assembly Voting	Abstention / Opposition (Initially)	Support for Ceasefire (Relatively Early)	Consistent & Strong Support for Ceasefire	Fragmented Bloc (Lack of Consensus)
Official Discourse: “Right to Defend”	Absolute & Unconditional (<i>Staatsräson</i>)	Conditional on Civilian Protection	Highly Critical; Focus on “Proportionality”	Fluctuating Bloc (Gradual Erosion)
Recognition of the State of Palestine	Categorical Rejection (Subject to Negotiations)	“Postponed” Recognition as a Pressure Tool	Formal & Actual Recognition (May 2024)	Proactive Bloc (Shift to Unilateralism)
Stance on Arms Exports	Sustained and increased supply	Partial or cautious suspension	Full suspension; Calls for EU-wide embargo	Contradictory Bloc (Values vs. Practice Gap)
Financial Support (UNRWA/Aid)	Temporary suspension, then conditional resumption	Continued with increased oversight	Increased funding & absolute political support	Supportive Bloc (Humanitarian Consensus)

Source: Adapted from Tzidkiyahu & Bermant (Nov 2024)

Table 3 demonstrates that the concept of Israel's political legitimacy in Western Europe is no longer treated as a monolithic bloc; rather, it has undergone a process

of 'normative fragmentation.' While Germany has maintained the 'existential legitimacy' of the Zionist project, countries such as Spain have contributed to stripping Israel of its 'moral legitimacy' through legal and diplomatic instruments. This divergence, as illustrated above, substantiates the study's hypothesis: European decisions are increasingly made under the pressure of 'moral conditionality,' rather than being driven solely by a default strategic alliance.

IV. Explanatory Comparison: Why Do the Paths Diverge?

The divergence between the U.S. and Western European trajectories can be understood through two primary points:

1. **Public Opinion:** While the United States shows a clearly measured increasing negative trend ([Silver](#), April 8, 2025), Western Europe shows synchronized historic lows across multiple nations ([Henley](#), [June 3, 2025](#)).
2. **Institutional Discourse:** The United States leans toward a “balancing” rhetoric in official briefings (Humanitarian + Security). In contrast, Western Europe has produced a collective institutional document (European Council) that explicitly articulates an “immediate ceasefire” and a “permanent end to hostilities” ([Department Press Briefing – March 25, 2024](#); [European Council Conclusions on the Middle East, Jun 26, 2025](#)).

Unlike the United States, where the shift is managed via a “tonal adjustment” of rhetoric, Western Europe shows a greater tendency to directly inject political conditionality into official documents, making the European change appear more institutionalized and less elusive.

For comparative methodology and to transcend the problematic generalization of the European stance, this study employs the 'Variance Radar' tool, as illustrated in Figure 3. This visualization aims at quantifying the fundamental disparities across five sovereign and institutional indicators that constitute the pillars of political legitimacy. This visual approach facilitates the monitoring of the 'normative fragmentation' that has impacted the European position, wherein the diplomatic maneuvering space for each model (Germany, France, and Spain) varies based on internal power balances, historical obligations, and the degree of responsiveness to pressures from international law and UN institutions.




Figure (3): The Diplomatic Variance Radar: Measuring the Divergence of Israel's Political Legitimacy Across Three European Models (2024–2026)

The visual analysis presented in the radar chart above reveals a structural split in the architecture of legitimacy. While the Spanish model (highlighted in red) stands out for its extensive scope of critical revisionism—particularly regarding the recognition of the State of Palestine and legal accountability—the German model (highlighted in blue) remains confined within the sphere of traditional support.

Between these two poles, the French trajectory (highlighted in gray) emerges as a case of pragmatic oscillation, attempting to reconcile mounting public pressure with the preservation of its influential interest networks in the region. This disparity in “coverage areas” substantiates the study’s hypothesis: Israel's political legitimacy in Europe is no longer grounded in a unified normative consensus. Instead, it has become hostage to acute normative polarization following the events of October 7, 2023.

V. Interim Conclusion

Evidence from polls and official documents suggests that the Gaza war did not terminate Western alliances with Israel, but it significantly eroded the automatic nature of its political legitimacy. It has increased the presence of “Conditionality” in discourse, especially within Western Europe, while the pattern of “Cost Management” persists in the United States (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#)).

Political Legitimacy Shifts and the Concept of “Audience Costs”

I. Theoretical Framework: The Audience Costs Model

In International Relations (IR) literature, Audience Costs refer to the political penalty a leader faces from their domestic constituency for failing to follow through on statements or adopting policies that clash with public expectations. This concept, fundamentally developed by James D. Fearon (1994) and Kenneth A. Schultz (2001), posits that democratic regimes are particularly sensitive to domestic pressure; leaders are held accountable at the ballot box if they disregard the public mood or violate their stated positions (Fearon, 1994).

II. Application to the Case Study

1. **Pre-Gaza War (Low Audience Costs):** Before 2023, Israel’s political legitimacy—especially in the United States—was stable (Silver & Fagen, July 11, 2022). Consequently, supporting Israel imposed minimal electoral costs on politicians, as it largely aligned with public expectations, particularly among Republican and mainstream Democratic bases.
2. **Post-Gaza War (Rising Audience Costs):** With the surge in public negativity (Silver, April 8, 2025; Smith, June 3, 2025), defending unconditional support has become politically expensive. As public dissatisfaction grows, the “cost” for a leader to maintain an unwavering pro-Israel discourse rises proportionately.

III. Why is Western Europe Responding Faster?

According to the Audience Costs theory, costs escalate when:

- The system is highly sensitive to public opinion.
- The parliamentary structure is vulnerable to coalition pressure.
- The official discourse is tethered to strong normative values (e.g., Human Rights).

In Europe, the multiplicity of institutions (EU vs. National Governments) and the strength of coalition parties accelerate this response. This explains why the European Council shifted toward calling for an “immediate ceasefire” (June 2025) as a mechanism to mitigate rising domestic political costs (European Council Conclusions on the Middle East, Jun 26, 2025).

To transcend the problematic generalization of treating the European stance as a monolithic bloc, this study employs the 'Variance Radar' tool to measure the

diplomatic maneuvering space of three representative models: Germany, France, and Spain. This visualization aims to quantify the fundamental disparities across five sovereign and institutional indicators, ranging from voting behavior at the United Nations to the degree of responsiveness to international law. This visual approach facilitates the monitoring of the 'normative fragmentation' that has impacted Israel's political legitimacy, where the diplomatic maneuvering space of each state varies according to its internal power balances and its historical or legal obligations.




Figure (4): Matrix of Political and Normative Response Variance in Western Europe

Model developed by the researchers based on diplomatic fragmentation indicators (2024–2025)

The visual analysis in Figure 4 reveals a structural split. The Spanish model represents the maximum scope of critical revisionism (recognition of Palestine/legal accountability), while the German model remains contracted within the sphere of traditional support governed by *Staatsräson* (Reason of State). France occupies a pragmatic middle ground, oscillating to balance public pressure with regional influence. This “coverage variance” proves that Israeli legitimacy in Europe is no longer a consensus but a hostage to intense normative struggles.

IV. The United States: Cost Management vs. Full Response

In contrast, ([Department Press Briefing – March 25, 2024](#)) exhibits a pattern of “Rhetorical Balancing.” Theoretically, this indicates that the United States administration recognizes the rising Audience Costs but chooses to manage them by integrating humanitarian vocabulary without adopting a radical institutional shift that might create a counter-cost from other electoral bases. In short, the United States has not withdrawn support; it has repackaged it to reduce domestic penalties.

V. Broader Theoretical Significance

Integrating Audience Costs bridges the gap between public opinion shifts, evolving official rhetoric, and the redefinition of alliances. Legitimacy shifts are thus understood not merely as moral dilemmas, but as rational responses by democratic leaders seeking to minimize electoral risks.

Future Scenarios: The Trajectory of Western Support for Israel

Scenario (1): Sustained Support with Permanent Conditionality

In this scenario, the West does not dissolve the alliance but redefines it as a functional security and political partnership governed by humanitarian or political “thresholds” to mitigate high domestic audience costs.

- **Rational for Probability:** European Council documents show an institutional shift toward ceasefire and humanitarian rhetoric, aligned with a sustained negative trend in the European public opinion (Henley, [June 3, 2025](#); [European Council Conclusions on the Middle East, Jun 26, 2025](#)).
- **Early Indicators:** 1. The repetition of terms such as “Immediate Ceasefire” and “Permanent End to Hostilities” in official EU documents ([European Council Conclusions on the Middle East, Jun 26, 2025](#)). 2. The expansion of “Conditional Support” in E3 (UK, France, Germany) statements regarding aid and lifting restrictions ([Aid to Gaza: E3 foreign ministers' statement, 23 April 2025](#)). 3. The transition of the debate from a “moral stance” to “policy instruments” (e.g., linking trade or cooperation agreements to compliance with humanitarian standards).
- **Outcome:** A continued relationship but with significantly reduced maneuvering space and a Western political discourse hypersensitive to humanitarian escalation.

Scenario (2): Escalating Transatlantic and Intra-European Divergence

This scenario envisions a widening gap between Western Europe (higher conditionality and internal fragmentation) and the United States (institutionally stable support but governed by intense domestic polarization).

- **Rational for Probability:** Polling shows synchronized and severe favorability declines across Europe, whereas the United States displays a partisan-driven erosion (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#); Henley, [June 3, 2025](#)).
- **Early Indicators:** Public friction between European and American positions in international forums.

- A “Multi-speed Europe,” where some nations advance toward high conditionality while others resist.
- Increased volatility in U.S. foreign policy between electoral cycles due to Congressional and media polarization (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#); Van Green et al., [Oct 3, 2025](#)).
- **Outcome:** The West as a cohesive bloc becomes less capable of providing a unified political umbrella, creating a more complex and uneven alliance environment.

Scenario (3): Partial Legitimacy Rebound (Gradual Normalization)

Following the peak of war-induced pressure, a gradual rebound may occur as media attention wanes and other priorities (economy, energy, or other conflicts) emerge, allowing governments to slowly ease conditionality.

- **Rational for Probability:** Legitimacy shifts are often tied to media momentum and the “ceiling of public attention.” However, current data suggests some changes are structural, making a full return to “automaticity” unlikely.
- **Early Indicators:** A gradual decline or plateauing of negative sentiments in Pew and YouGov waves (Silver, [April 8, 2025](#); Henley, [June 3, 2025](#)).
 - A softening of “Immediate Ceasefire” language in European documents.
 - A return of United States rhetoric to security-dominant narratives with reduced humanitarian emphasis ([Department Press Briefing – March 25, 2024](#)).
- **Outcome:** Relative alliance stability, but with a “political memory” that allows for the rapid reactivation of conditionality in any future escalation.

Conclusion:

The available evidence renders Scenario (1), 'Permanent Conditionality,' the most consistent with current trends. Meanwhile, Scenario (2) remains plausible should the gap deepen through tangible policies; indeed, *this study is more inclined to adopt this second scenario than either the first or third*. As for Scenario (3), it remains partially possible, but is contingent upon a shift in public sentiment and a decline in media and political pressure.

The Recognition of Palestine as a Strategic Turning Point

The move toward recognizing the State of Palestine represents a pivotal event, reflecting a shift from linguistic crisis management to a deeper diplomatic repositioning.

- **The Global Wave:** In addition to European recognition announcements in 2024, Australia and Canada’s announcements on September 21, 2025, signify a coordinated wave within the Western camp (Australia’s royal dilemma as King Charles serves conflicting Commonwealth interests with Trump, [June 11, 2025](#)).
- **Coordination vs. Dependence:** While Australia and Canada share the Crown with the UK as “Commonwealth Realms,” their foreign policy decisions are exercised independently. Their synchronized recognition in September 2025—mirroring the UK’s trajectory—points toward “Strategic Convergence” rather than political dependence (Australia joins UK and Canada in formally recognising the Palestinian state, [Sep 21, 2025](#)).

Conclusion of Scenarios: This trajectory suggests that Western conditionality is evolving from humanitarian-legal rhetoric into sovereign diplomatic actions. While the alliance remains, its boundaries are being redefined through:

1. Formal recognition of the State of Palestine.
2. Linking cooperation to political milestones.
3. Escalating parliamentary pressure within Western capitals.

Study Conclusion: Toward an Era of “Anxious Conditionality”

I. General Findings

This study concludes that the 2023 Gaza war was not merely a military conflict but a structural turning point in Western-Israeli relations. Through analyzing political legitimacy across three levels (grassroots, official, and institutional), the findings can be summarized as follows:

1. **From Automaticity to Conditionality:** Western support is no longer a “blank check.” The “Legitimacy Gap” charts demonstrate that governments now operate under escalating domestic pressure, shifting support from its previous “existential” form to a “conditional” one, predicated on adherence to humanitarian and legal standards.
2. **European Normative Fragmentation:** Western Europe is no longer a monolithic bloc. While Germany remains anchored in its historical specificity, Spain and Ireland have emerged as drivers of an alternative

legitimacy based on international law, with France representing a difficult pragmatic balance. This divergence, shown in the “Diplomatic Radar,” weakens Israel’s reliance on a future European consensus.

3. **The Impact of International Legalization:** Rulings by international courts (ICJ and ICC) have transcended legal procedure to become “political pressure indicators.” They have redefined the boundaries of acceptable discourse and forced policymakers to balance strategic alliances against global reputation.

The fundamental shifts in the levels of Israel's political legitimacy within Western societies, as observed in this study following the Gaza War, are not limited in their repercussions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict alone. Rather, they extend to form a strategic constraint on any future military alliances in the region. Should the United States and Israel engage in an open military confrontation against regional actors such as Iran, the “legitimacy gap”—manifested in the division between political elites and Western grassroots—could lead to the erosion of the moral foundation of this alliance. This would make it increasingly difficult for Western governments to market the “war bill” or justify the resulting political and economic costs to a public opinion that has become more sensitive to legal and humanitarian standards.

Consequently, any military escalation led by Washington and Tel Aviv against Tehran will be weighed against the “normative fragmentation” currently afflicting the European position. Countries adopting “critical revisionism,” such as Spain and Ireland, may find in such a conflict an additional justification to distance themselves from Israeli policies. Meanwhile, states that maintain “steadfast support,” such as Germany, may face deep structural pressures to balance their historical commitments with their obligations under international law. This landscape indicates that the “strategic legitimacy” Israel once enjoyed in the West as a functional ally is no longer a blank check; instead, it has become hostage to the ability of Western decision-making institutions to bridge the widening gap between public aspirations and changing universal values.

Western public opinion, which has grown critical of Israeli conduct in Gaza, will be more resistant to entering major regional wars to support such behavior. This transforms the “legitimacy crisis” from a mere “reputational” crisis into a “capacity” crisis regarding the ability to sustain long-term warfare.

In summary, Israel faces a “legitimacy restoration” crisis in the West. While military support persists, the moral and legal capital accumulated over decades has faced unprecedented erosion, potentially reshaping the long-term geopolitical balance of the Palestinian cause.

II. Scientific Contribution

This study offers three primary additions to International Relations literature:

- **Integrating Grassroots and Official Spheres:** Moving beyond isolated analyses to treat “Political Legitimacy” as a composite phenomenon.
- **Transatlantic Comparative Analysis:** Highlighting the distinct transformation mechanisms between Western Europe and the United States.
- **Forward-Looking Explanatory Framework:** Providing evidence-based scenarios for the medium-term trajectory of Western-Israeli relations.

III. Limitations of the Study

Despite the extensive database and multi-layered sources, this study remains subject to several limitations:

- **Methodological Scope:** The analysis relies primarily on official documents and public opinion surveys, without incorporating qualitative interviews with high-level policymakers.
- **Geographical Focus:** The study focuses on Western Europe and the United States, excluding other key nations within the Western camp, such as Canada and Australia.
- **Temporal Proximity:** The recent nature of the events means that some conclusions remain preliminary and may be subject to revision as more longitudinal data and subsequent official records become available.

IV. Future Research Horizons

This study proposes three primary avenues for subsequent scholarly inquiry:

1. **Expanding Comparative Scope:** Extending the comparative analysis to include other Western democratic models beyond the current European-American framework.
2. **Electoral Impact Analysis:** Investigating how upcoming elections and changes in government administration influence the trajectory of “Conditionality” in foreign policy.
3. **Longitudinal Correlation Studies:** Conducting longitudinal research that directly links specific field developments (on the ground) with fluctuating trends in Western public opinion over an extended period.

V. Recommendations

Based on the documented erosion of political legitimacy, the study recommends the following:

1. **Capitalizing on the Legitimacy Gap:** Palestinian diplomacy and human-rights organizations should focus on “Youth Demographics” (Gen Z and Millennials) and Independents in the U.S., as data confirms they are the actual drivers of the narrative shift.
2. **Institutionalizing European Conditionality:** Leveraging the “Normative Fragmentation” model by strengthening ties with “legally sovereign” states (e.g., Spain/Ireland) to transform verbal criticism into legal and economic measures within EU institutions.
3. **Activating Legal Diplomacy:** Ensuring a continuous flow of documented human rights reports to Western **Think Tanks**, given that “Institutional Legitimacy” is now directly influenced by international court decisions.
4. **Evolving the Media Narrative:** Transitioning from a narrative of “Victimization” to one of “Accountability,” as Western audiences respond more effectively to language linking democratic principles with universal human rights.
5. **Establishing a “Legitimacy Observatory”:** Creating an academic body (e.g., a Palestinian-Turkish university collaboration) to monitor Western public opinion trends periodically, ensuring strategies are updated based on the latest statistical shifts.

VI. General Summary

The findings indicate that Israel’s future within the West is being politically renegotiated rather than strategically reconstructed. Western support continues but has taken the form of a more cautious and conditional relationship. This shift is a decisive element in understanding Western-Israeli relations in the coming years, whether it stabilizes at “Permanent Conditionality” or evolves into wider transatlantic divergence.

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